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8

Herbert Kilburn, 23rd Ohio Infantry

Battles of South Mountain and Antietam

September to October 1862

The Second Battle of Bull Run was another major defeat for the Union. Probably the main cause was Pope’s lack of information; he never knew where the Confederate forces were or where they were going, and oftentimes he didn’t even know where many of his own forces were. He was convinced to the very end that he was winning and the Confederates were retreating, which was never the case. Pope was also convinced that many people in the Union Army were working against him, which was probably true. McClellan was highly resentful of Pope being given this army, and wanted to see him fail. The corps and division commanders taken away from McClellan felt the same – a lot of their loyalty was placed on McClellan more than on the Army, which is always dangerous. Published accusations flew back and forth for many years after the war, with many of the participants writing articles and books telling how it all "really happened."

One of the many factors cited by Pope in analyzing his defeat was the absence of Cox’s Kanawha Division, in which Herbert Kilburn was a member. This division had been ordered to come join the rest of the Army of Virginia in mid-August, and had arrived in the Washington area on the 24th – plenty of time to walk over and join the battle. But McClellan, seeing the large battle that was forming, ordered Cox’s four regiments to occupy the earthworks at Upton’s Hill, blocking the road from Centerville to Washington.

The 23rd Ohio was placed in Fort Ramsey, one of the first forts built to defend Washington at the start of the war. It was built around the Upton Mansion, which is still standing today in what is now John Marshall Drive in Arlington, Virginia. They were close enough to hear the battle, but were instructed by McClellan to remain where they were and "hold the line at all hazards." The problem is that they were not under McClellan’s command, and he had no legal right to order them anywhere. They already had their orders to join Pope’s army. Pope complained later that "had Cox’s and Sturgis’ Divisions been as far west as Bull Run on that day [the night of the 26th], the movement of Jackson on Manassas Junction would not have been practicable." This may or may not be true, and the presence of four more regiments probably would not have changed the final outcome of such a large battle. But it may have made some small difference, and the fact remains that the 23rd Ohio should have been at Bull Run but was wrongfully kept out of it.

* * *

Immediately after the battle, Lee took the Confederate army north through the Blue Ridge Mountains, forded the Potomac River, and invaded Maryland around Sharpsburg and Harper’s Ferry. They had no real hope of actually gaining anything by this – half of them had no shoes, food or equipment. Lee just wanted to get the fighting out of Virginia, find food for his men, keep the Federal armies busy away from Richmond, and make an impression on foreign audiences.

Just as George Washington during the Revolutionary War kept trying for one big victory to gain foreign recognition and draw France into the war, so the Confederates were trying to demonstrate to the outside world that they were capable of defending themselves and existing as a real country. At this time other countries, most importantly Britain and France, were close to recognizing the Confederacy’s right to exist. A Confederate victory on Federal ground following the victory at Bull Run would probably have tipped the balance – and Britain and France, who wanted the war ended because it was affecting world commerce, would have pressured the United States to negotiate for peace and give up the southern states.

Lincoln, on the other hand, was preparing to move the war up to a higher level politically by issuing his Emancipation Proclamation, a critical factor in keeping the Europeans out of the war. Up until now the war had simply been a struggle between the South, trying to gain independence, and the Federal Government, trying to keep the country together. The primary issues were economics and States’ rights. Once Lincoln made the abolishment of slavery an issue of the war, Britain and France could not support the slave-holding South without going against their own anti-slavery policies. But the Proclamation would carry no force if issued following a Federal defeat, so Lincoln was anxiously waiting for a significant Union victory.

* * *

On September 2, 1862, the Army of Virginia was merged into the Army of the Potomac under McClellan. Within this new organization, the 23rd Ohio (commanded by Lt Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes) was part of the 1st Brigade (Gen Scammon), Kanawha Division (Gen Cox), IX Corps (Gen A.E. Burnside). Leaving some units behind for the defense of Washington (including Henry Kilburn in the 12th Ohio Battery), McClellan took the main part of his army north to find Lee.

The Maryland Campaign, as it is called officially, lasted from September 6 to 22. The Army marched north from Washington toward Frederick, Maryland. Herbert Kilburn was now assigned regular infantry duty with his regiment, but they still played together as a band occasionally. Rutherford B. Hayes recorded in his diary that they were camped near Brookville about September 10, and remarked that their band was now a novelty, as almost all others had been mustered out of service – he doesn’t mention how kept his own together, when it was supposed to have been dissolved.

About this time the Army tried another new organizational structure. We see them going to larger units as the war progresses: at first the emphasis was on brigades; then as armies got larger they combined several brigades into divisions, then several divisions were combined to form a Corps – this last was forced by the Government against McClellan’s wishes. The problem was span of control; the U.S. had never had such large armies in the field before, and didn’t know how to manage them. One man could not possibly know where all the pieces of the army were at any moment. Now, prior to Antietam, they took another step and combined two Corps into a Wing. General Jesse Reno took over IX Corps, as General Burnside moved up to command the Wing consisting of IX Corps and Hooker’s I Corps.

The army reached Frederick on September 12, driving out a small Confederate detachment there. While on a rest break after occupying the town, some men found a copy of Lee’s general orders for the Confederate Army. Up until that moment, the Union Army knew only that the Confederates were somewhere in northern Maryland. Now McClellan knew exactly where all of Lee’s units were, and where they were supposed to be heading. If he moved quickly, he could trap and destroy each of the separated parts of Lee’s army. The only problem was that McClellan never moved quickly.

To reach Lee’s army from Frederick, the Army of the Potomac had to follow the National Road (Alt. U.S. Highway 40 today) over the Catoctin Ridge, pass through Middletown, then cross over South Mountain. South Mountain is actually another long, low ridge, the northern extension of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Two roads crossing South Mountain were important to them: Turner’s Gap on the National Road, and Crampton’s Gap about six miles further south. Turner’s Gap would bring them down upon Lee’s main army, while the Crampton’s Gap route would relieve the Union garrison that was presently under attack at Harper’s Ferry. General Franklin’s VI Corps of 18,000 men headed for Crampton’s Gap. McClellan sent the remaining 70,000 men toward Turner’s Gap.

The advance guard on the march from Frederick to South Mountain was Reno’s IX Corps. And the lead division of the Corps was Cox’s two Ohio brigades, in which Herbert was a member. Catton’s history says the Ohio troops were "happy to be with the Army of the Potomac", as it was far ahead of the other Union armies. This was also the first large influx of "Western" troops into an army that had been formed mostly from the northeast. Other units remarked that the Western troops were more informal in bearing and discipline.

They set off from Frederick along the National Road on September 13, crossed the low ridge of the Catoctin Range, and by that evening reached the small town of Middletown on the Catoctin River. About 6:00 that evening McClellan sent orders to Franklin on the southern end of the advance, that they should both cross South Mountain on the next day, starting at daybreak.

McClellan has always been criticized for moving too slowly, and this is a prime example. There were no rebel forces on South Mountain on September 13. The Union Army could easily have continued up the Mountain during the night, and gone through the passes the next day without fighting, probably surprising Lee. But they stopped in the valley below; rebel scouts saw their campfires and sent word to Lee, and it was the Confederates who moved several regiments up onto the ridges during the night.

The main part of the Union Army took half the day (September 14) to cross the Catoctin Ridge and march at a leisurely pace through Middletown (a distance of only five miles), so for most of the morning Cox’s Kanawha Division and a few cavalry regiments were the only Union forces on South Mountain. The cavalry crossed the valley from Middletown to the base of the ridge at dawn, followed by the infantry. The cavalry scouts discovered that the Confederates now occupied the ridge, so Cox’s Division left the National Road about a mile before it started uphill and took a smaller road that came up through Fox Gap, a mile south of Turner’s Gap. They stopped at the base of the mountain and rested a bit while some artillery was brought forward to shell the Confederates above them.

When they started up the mountain they didn’t go marching up the road in columns, but were extended in a long "battle line." The hillside was not steep, but was tangled with vines and shrubs. Near the top of the pass, the ground cleared and leveled into small farms and pastures. The Confederates, a North Carolina brigade under Gen. Sam Garland, were waiting at the top behind stone fences.

The 23rd Ohio’s regimental history claims they were "in the lead" here, and the first into battle; perhaps it appeared that way to them at the time, but actually the 30th Ohio was the first to reach the pass. They got as far as the stone wall and were stopped there. Cox then sent the 11th Ohio up the rise to the left side of the pass. They ended up in a dead-end pocket surrounded by rebels on three sides, so they backed out quickly. Cox then sent the 11th and 23rd regiments together back into the same pocket. They were hit with rifle fire, grapeshot and cannister shot from three sides at once. The commander (Hayes) and four other officers were badly wounded, and over a hundred out of the 350 men were killed or wounded within a few minutes. Major Comly took command of the 23rd Ohio after Lt Col. Hayes was wounded. They stayed in this position for some time; Hayes reappeared with a half-dressed broken arm and insisted on fighting until he was forcibly carried off the field by his men. Then Cox sent in the rest of the brigade. They made a bayonet charge (despite what we see in the movies, this actually happened very rarely) and drove the Confederates from the wall and back into the woods. At this point the only people on South Mountain were Cox’s Division of 3000 men, and another North Carolina brigade of 1000 men at Turner’s Gap.

Cox next tried to go north across the ridge top from Fox Gap to Turner’s Gap, but they were driven back by Confederate artillery. Cox sent back for reinforcements, but they didn’t arrive until a few hours past noon. By that time the Confederates had gotten three more brigades into Turner’s Gap, under General D.H. Hill. McClellan’s main army was just now crossing over Catoctin Ridge.

Willcox’s Division then came up to join Cox, along with General Reno, and they started north along the ridge once more. They got up onto the crest by late afternoon, having another fight along another stone wall. At the top, Reno stopped to bring fresher regiments forward and let the front regiments have a rest, when a group of rebels began firing from the woods – General Reno was killed. General Cox took command of IX Corps. It was now 4:00 in the afternoon, and the first parts of the main army (Hooker’s I Corps) were just approaching the bottom of the ridge; it was another hour before they formed up and started up the hillside. Most of Hooker’s Corps went up to the north of Turner’s Gap, on the rise opposite Cox. A smaller group (the Wisconsin "Iron Brigade") went straight up the road. There was heavy fighting until past dark, then during the night the rebels abandoned the mountain. The 23rd Ohio had made three bayonet charges into the Confederate lines that day, and had lost 50 killed and 150 wounded. As far as we know, Herbert should have been a part of all this.

The main effect of the Battle of South Mountain was that it forced the subsequent Battle of Antietam. If McClellan had just sent a few regiments up the road on the night of the 13th, the whole army could have crossed the mountain without a fight on the 14th. They would have surprised Lee’s army still widely separated in small groups, and could have destroyed them. The extra day taken for South Mountain was enough for Lee to gather the pieces of his army together at Sharpsburg. McClellan now gave Lee another free day to prepare.

On September 15, the Army of the Potomac crossed South Mountain and approached Antietam Creek. This time the IX Corps was further back in the line of march; they passed through Fox Gap after noon, and followed Sumner’s Wing (II and XII Corps) up the Boonsboro-Sharpsburg Turnpike (Maryland Highway 34 today). General Cox later wrote that he "was with the Kanawha Division, assuming that my temporary command of the Corps (after Reno had been killed) ended with the battle on the mountain." They reached the line of hills bordering Antietam Creek about 3:00 p.m. and pulled off the road to the left. At the close of the day, IX Corps was ordered to camp behind some hills bordering the creek, about a mile south of the Sharpsburg Bridge.

The next day they did nothing. McClellan was immobilized by his usual fear that they were outnumbered, when in fact (as was also usually the case) his army outnumbered Lee’s by more than two to one; and McClellan’s army had food and ammunition. He wasted the entire day assembling his whole army, moving them about, and convincing himself that he had it all arranged "just right." Worse still, because of his compulsion to have all the troops that he possibly could right there with him, he brought Franklin’s VI Corps back in. Those men were supposed to have gone to the aid of the Harper’s Ferry garrison, and in doing so would also have prevented the Confederates that were there from later helping Lee at Antietam. Abandoned, the Harper’s Ferry garrison was captured on the 17th. The six Confederate brigades under Gen A.P. Hill started back toward Sharpsburg.

Still on the 16th, McClellan also made some last-minute changes in command. He removed Hooker’s I Corps from Burnside’s Wing (this was at his friend Hooker’s request) and made it independent. Then he took Mansfield’s XII Corps from Sumner’s Wing and had it support Hooker. This left Burnside with only one Corps in his "Wing". Burnside told Cox of the changes in the afternoon, and Cox suggested that Burnside should take direct command of the IX Corps, and allow Cox to go back to his Kanawha Division. Burnside refused to do this, as it would be a step down. So Cox remained in charge of IX Corps through the Battle of Antietam, with Burnside immediately over him. The IX Corps thus had two commanders, and each one considered the other to be the "real" commander – this would lead to some confusion and lack of coordination during the battle. A similar situation arose in the Kanawha Division. Scammon was technically in charge of the Division during this battle. But he still thought of Cox as the "real" commander; Scammon stayed with his own brigade and mostly ignored the other parts of the Division.

The night of the 16th they made final adjustments in their positions. Sturgis’ Division was stationed on either side of a road leading to a small stone bridge (which would ever afterward be known as Burnside’s Bridge); Willcox’s Division was kept as reserves behind Sturgis; Rodman’s Division was half a mile off on the left, where there was supposed to be a ford. Cox’s Kanawha Division was split up, since Cox had to command the whole Corps: Scammon’s Brigade (with Herbert Kilburn) went with Rodman’s Division on the left side, and Crook’s Brigade went with Sturgis. Hooker took his I Corps north of the rest of the army, crossed over to the Confederate side of Antietam Creek, and came back south to be ready to attack in the morning. It rained steadily all through the night.

There is much disagreement about what happened, and when and why things happened, during the next day. As with Bull Run, many books have been written about Antietam, and it is very difficult to sort out whose viewpoint is more correct. Most of the arguments, which are still continuing 140 years later, center around what McClellan told people to do, vs. what they thought he told them. Since almost nothing was being recorded right at the time it happened, all the reports are based on what the participants remembered, or thought they remembered, afterward – and we also need to keep in mind that every person who wrote a report would try to explain the events to make himself look better.

McClellan’s main problem, as with all large battles, was a lack of communications between the parts of his army. Antietam was not really one battle, but three separate battles fought one after the other on different parts of the field. If all the Union forces had been employed at the same time, the Confederates would have been completely destroyed. But by sending in only a part of his army at one time, McClellan allowed Lee just enough time to move his men around to face each attack. Although badly outnumbered, Lee was able to pull enough men from quiet parts of the field to match the partial attacks at any one spot.

The Battle of Antietam began at dawn of September 17, with Hooker’s Corps attacking from the north. This is known as the "Cornfield Battle", between East Wood and West Wood. The Union forces were trying to go about a mile through the cornfield and the woods to reach Dunkard Church. After the first few attacks were stopped, Hooker brought in Mansfield’s Corps to join his own. They fought back and forth, neither side gaining anything, from dawn until 10:00 a.m., until both sides were completely wrecked and unable to continue.

At that time, Sumner was sent across the creek to help Hooker. Like Burnside, Sumner was supposed to be a Wing commander, but had been reduced by McClellan to have only the II Corps. They crossed the "upper bridge" and headed west toward Hooker’s position – but the lead units got headed in the wrong direction and they missed Hooker completely. They ended up about a mile south of where they intended, and attacked the Confederate line along a sunken road. The "Sunken Road" or "Bloody Lane" battle lasted for several hours, and like the earlier one ended when both sides were too exhausted and ruined to continue.

The third part of the battle, in which Herbert Kilburn was involved, is known as Burnside’s Attack or "Burnside’s Bridge." This started in the afternoon, after the other fighting had stopped. McClellan would afterward say that he had intended for Burnside to attack at the same time as Hooker, at dawn. But both Burnside and Cox always said this was not true; their impression was that McClellan told them to wait until Hooker’s attack was proceeding favorably, then create a diversion at their end to prevent Lee from moving any men to the north end – although even in that they failed. McClellan’s own report made immediately after the battle actually supports Burnside’s impression: "the design was to make the main attack on the enemy’s left [i.e. the north end, Hooker’s], ... to create a diversion ... by assailing the enemy’s right [Burnside], and then ... attack their center with any reserve I might have in hand." McClellan later changed his story to say that he had intended Burnside to make a full attack at the same time and same strength as Hooker’s, and put more emphasis on Burnside’s failure to attack The truth is always somewhere in between – McClellan can be faulted for not telling Burnside exactly what he was supposed to do; but Burnside should certainly have been able to get across the creek and attack while Hooker’s attack was still proceeding.

In any case, while Hooker’s attack was in progress, Burnside was mostly moving men around on his end of the field. Both sides began firing artillery at dawn, and as it became light, parts of the IX Corps were discovered to be exposed to direct fire. Rodman’s Division, especially, suffered many casualties before any fighting started – Herbert Kilburn, in Scammon’s Brigade, was positioned with this division. They had to move to more protected areas behind the hills. Meanwhile, Crook’s Brigade was ordered to have the first try at crossing the stone bridge. The selection was made by Burnside, and was intended as a compliment for their good performance at South Mountain. At 7:00 a.m. they were ordered to advance toward the river as far as possible without exposing themselves to fire. There they sat and waited for several hours for further orders.

Sometime during the morning, McClellan ordered Burnside to cross the river and attack from the south end. The original report, and the time accepted by Bruce Catton in his Civil War history, say the order came at about 9:00. McClellan afterward said it was earlier, and claimed he had to repeat the order three times before Burnside would move. Both Cox and Burnside claimed the order was given only once, at 10:00. Cox later wrote that he was on a hill all morning with Burnside, and that they were watching Sumner’s Corps advance toward Sunken Road – which would agree with 10:00 – when the messenger brought the order; Burnside relayed the order to Cox immediately without delay or discussion.

One point on which most people seem to agree was that Burnside was far too concerned with how to get across the stone bridge. They would have to cross open ground to get to it, and the Confederates were occupying the bluffs on the opposite side. Burnside considered a direct assault on the bridge nearly impossible, so he sent Rodman’s Division and Scammon’s Brigade south along the creek to find the rumored ford. Herbert Kilburn would have been a part of this little expedition. They were supposed to cross over the creek and come up behind the Confederate positions on the bluffs, forcing them to withdraw from the bridge. They spent hours looking for the ford, which may not have existed at all. Rodman was later killed during this battle, so there is no official report for the division. All we know is that there was some artillery and infantry opposition to their advance, and the winding stream added more time than expected to their march, so that they never got back to the bridge until after it had been crossed.

Some people say that Burnside was so obsessed with crossing the bridge and finding the mystery ford that he never noticed the creek was only waist-deep and could have been crossed anywhere. That may be an exaggeration, but it is certainly true in part: Rodman’s Division and Scammon’s Brigade eventually gave up looking for the ford and simply waded across downstream, and five companies of Crook’s Brigade ended up wading across upstream of the bridge.

The first attempt at crossing the bridge came shortly after 10:00, when Burnside and Cox say they received McClellan’s orders. Colonel Crook took three regiments of Ohio infantry, formed up into a battle line about 200 yards northeast of the bridge, marched them over a low hill toward the creek – and missed the bridge completely. They ended up in a bend of the river a hundred yards to the north. They tried to move back along the edge of the water toward the bridge, but were stopped by intense fire.

Next up was Nagel’s Brigade from Sturgis’ Division. They tried going straight down the road along the riverbank to the bridge. This route was directly under Confederate fire, and the attack was broken up before getting near the bridge. General Cox then placed some infantry near the river to keep the Confederates under fire, and the Federal artillery also started shelling the overlooking bluffs. It was now past noon, and nothing had been accomplished yet. Hooker’s attack was finished; Sumner was stopped at Bloody Lane and the battle there was raging. This is the time that McClellan started repeating his orders for Burnside to do something.

Cox finally directed Sturgis to take two regiments and push them across the bridge, no matter what the cost. Sturgis asked for volunteers, offering a keg of whiskey. The 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania raced for it, and just ran straight across the bridge with almost no casualties. As soon as they had made it across, the Confederates, who were actually very few in number, abandoned their positions at the bridge. Sturgis quickly brought the rest of his division across, along with Crook’s Brigade. They all formed up in battle line to continue the attack – and then discovered they had used up all their ammunition! Sturgis had not thought to have them resupply before going across the bridge. They called for more ammunition – but the wagons were too wide, and could not get across the bridge. Sturgis’ Division had to march back across the bridge, and Willcox’s Division came across to take their place. This all took another two hours, and they were finally ready to start their attack about 3:00 p.m.

In the meanwhile, Rodman’s Division and Scammon’s Brigade had found a place where there was not much resistance, and waded across the creek. They now came up from the south and joined Willcox. Rodman and Willcox started moving slowly toward Sharpsburg about 3:00. The battle at Bloody Lane was long over, and Lee had moved those troops back to the south end to face this new advance. The delays were later criticized by McClellan, but Cox correctly points out that all similar movements, including Mansfield and Sumner in support of Hooker, took about the same amount of time from start to finish.

The two divisions formed up with Willcox on the right, Rodman on the left. Herbert Kilburn was with Scammon’s Brigade on the extreme left, forming a reserve for Rodman behind the first line. Crook’s Brigade went with Willcox. Sturgis’ Division, with new ammunition, occupied the bluffs that the Confederates had abandoned.

The advance made slow progress against heavy resistance, but managed to reach the edge of town by 4:30. At that point they paused again due to running low on ammunition – they still had been unable to bring any wagons across the river. As they had been advancing, the divisions had become separated. The resistance was heavier on Willcox’s right side, so his units gradually curved around that way; and Rodman’s opposition was heavier on his left, so his division gradually swung around in that direction.

Suddenly, Rodman’s Division was attacked from the left, where no rebels had been before. Six brigades of Confederates under Gen. A.P. Hill had just arrived on the field after a 17-mile forced march from Harper’s Ferry (these were the troops who had captured the Union garrison there; they would never have been involved here if McClellan had sent Franklin’s Corps to help the garrison). The Confederates appeared suddenly out of tall fields of corn on the Union flank. They were dressed in captured blue uniforms, so the first Union troops to see them didn’t know who they were until they started shooting.

We are lacking information as to what happened initially, since we have no report on the battle from Rodman. It appears that Scammon’s brigade was the first to see them – that brigade was on the far left and slightly behind the main line of Rodman’s Division. The Confederate attack hit the ends of Scammon’s and Rodman’s lines at the same time. Scammon quickly changed front to face left, and his brigade drove back those Confederates immediately in front of them.

Reid’s history of the 23rd Ohio says that the regiment was on the right-hand side of the Brigade, that is, furthest from the initial attack. The regimental flag, already shot full of holes at South Mountain, was instantly disintegrated in a storm of bullets. A Federal battery behind the lines opened fire, but they shot too low and hit more Union troops than Confederates. Major Comly was still in command of the 23rd since South Mountain, and he formed up the regiment facing left with the rest of the brigade. Reid says that as soon as the brigade reformed and started firing, the Confederates immediately in front of them broke off and disappeared for no apparent reason. No one in the 23rd seems to have been killed; Reid says "little damage was done by the enemy except for a few captures." Scammon’s Brigade then occupied a line of stone fences, and held their position until ordered to withdraw. The main line of Rodman’s Division did not do so well.

Harlan’s Brigade was on the far left end of Rodman’s Division and was the first one hit by the surprise attack. This brigade had only been formed three weeks earlier and had no training at all; they should not have been in this battle. Rodman came over to take direct command of them, but he was killed in the initial attack; the brigade fell apart and ran off the field. That left the next brigade (Fairchild’s) suddenly exposed, so they had to fold back out of the line (remember the Division is also engaged in a heavy battle in front of them) and reform facing their left. Scammon’s Brigade was now left isolated, out in front of everyone else, surrounded on three sides.

Cox was in the center when this happened. He first ordered Willcox and Crook (who had been turning away fromRodman toward the right) to pull back to their left and join with Rodman’s line again. Then he brought Sturgis’ Division back up from the Bridge to fill the gap on Rodman’s left. Scammon’s Brigade held on at the stone wall until Sturgis formed a line behind them, and Rodman’s men were gathered behind Sturgis. Reid says that when the Brigade pulled back into the main line the 23rd Regiment did not receive the order, so they remained isolated out in front for some time until Col Scammon came out and told them to leave. That stopped the Confederate counterattack, but it also halted any further Union attempts for the day.

Even with the new Confederate forces, Burnside still outnumbered Lee’s forces in that part of the field by about two to one. He had nearly broken through, and still could have done so now that the line had stabilized again; of all the attacks that day, this was the only one to make an actual, steady advance and push the Confederate lines back. But Burnside couldn’t realize that; he saw only that his troops had narrowly survived a "close call", and was content to stop while he was ahead. Like McClellan, he never made use of the reserves available to him. Although the Confederates were on the edge of total collapse, and fully a third of the Union Army had not been used at all, the Battle of Antietam was effectively over. More than 20,000 men on each side had been killed or wounded, the worst single day of the entire war.

During the night the 23rd Ohio, "already near exhaustion from the fighting" (Reid), was ordered to support an artillery battalion from Sturgis’ Division. They remained on duty all that night and all the next day until relieved in the afternoon.

Both armies sat in place the next day (September 18). Lee’s army was unable to do anything, and was merely waiting for the final attack that would finish them. But McClellan still believed he was outnumbered, and sat waiting for the massive Confederate counterattack from Lee’s hidden reserves. No shots were fired from either side all day. During the night of September 18/19 the Confederates were able to quietly leave Sharpsburg and slip across the Potomac into Virginia. McClellan was quite pleased with himself for achieving a draw, and believed he had saved his army from certain annihilation. The Government in Washington could see what had actually happened, and Lincoln was furious that Lee had been allowed to escape; McClellan would be removed from command within six weeks. The battle was enough of a victory, however, for Lincoln to use it and issue his Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, 1862.

* * *

The 23rd Ohio remained camped in the area of Sharpsburg for a few weeks. Then, with the immediate threat to Washington ended, the Kanawha Division was ordered back to West Virginia once again. They left Sharpsburg on October 8 and marched north to Hagerstown, Maryland, arriving there on the 10th. From Hagerstown they were supposed to board trains for Clarksburg, West Virginia, but just at that time J.E.B. Stuart and 1800 Confederate cavalrymen raided Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, 20 miles north.

The 23rd was ordered to march north "double-quick" to chase after Stuart. Dyer records this "Expedition After Stuart" as October 13 and 14; Reid has it a day earlier. They marched north into Pennsylvania, then west for 25 miles, then back south through Maryland into Virginia. Needless to say, the Union infantry was not able to catch the Confederate cavalry. Reid says the 23rd Ohio arrived in Hancock, Maryland on October 13 (probably actually the 14th), having eaten breakfast in Pennsylvania, dinner in Maryland, and supper in Virginia.

From Hancock, Maryland, the 23rd Ohio moved by train to Clarksburg, West Virginia on October 15. They were now part of the 1st Brigade (Scammon), Kanawha Division, District of West Virginia, Department of Ohio (Gen. O.M. Mitchell). Major Comly was promoted to Lt Colonel for his actions in the Battles of South Mountain and Antietam; Lt Colonel Hayes was made a full Colonel, and Colonel Scammon became a Brigadier General. General Cox drops out of our picture at this time. The last we see of him is in command of IX Corps until October 8, then he disappears until April 1863, when he was appointed Commander of the District of Ohio. General Scammon commanded the Kanawha Division until October, then he went back to his Brigade.

On October 24, 1862, the 23rd Ohio discharged some of the remaining members of its band, as it should have done back in August. Herbert Kilburn received an Honorable Discharge at this time, by reason of "Act of Congress." The discharge was signed at the "camp near Clarksburg, Virginia [now West Virginia]" by Captain Lovejoy, his company commander. Herbert returned home to New London, Ohio for about a year, but he will appear again later.

* * *

Following Herbert’s discharge, the 23rd Ohio continued on through West Virginia, returning to the Kanawha River area. They camped at Kanawha Falls for the winter 1862/1863. In March 1863, General Scammon was given command of the Division (now called the 3rd Division), and Colonel Hayes moved up to command the 1st Brigade. They were now part of the VIII Corps in the Middle Department. The regiment stayed in the West Virginia area for the rest of the war, taking part in numerous small battles and expeditions (see appendix).

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